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Why Not A Wheat Cartel? 
In the last decade there has been a series of startling events in 
the international grain arena which has evoked an increasing amount of 
attention on the part of agricultural economists. An important topic 
of discussion in the resulting flurry of theoretical and empirical litera-
ture has been the competitive structure of the international wheat market. 
McCalla appears to have been the first entrant into the fray with his 
pathbreaking duopoly model of the world wheat market. Subsequent ventures 
have included a triopoly model of the world wheat market (Alaouze, Watson 
and Sturgess) and another important contribution by McCalla outlining an 
array of strategies that market participants might attempt to follow and 
the resulting market situations that would arise from such marketing 
' 
strategies. 
Although these descriptive studies are important it appears that 
relatively little attention has been given to the formation of optimal 
strategies for the major participants on the supply sides of the inter-
national grain trade--the large grain companies such as Cargill, Continental, 
Bunge etc., and the Canadian and Australian Wheat Boards. At first glance 
the solution to the problem is rather trivial, i.e., these large sellers 
should exploit any monopoly-monopsony power they might possess. This, 
however, does not take account of the fact that the bulk of the operations 
of these firms are located in the United States and other major exporting 
regions. Hence, one must recognize that the exporting regions, while 
attempting to maximize their social welfare, will probably not allow these 
' 
firms a free hand. Specifically, suppose it is assumed that the exporters 
are not allowed to systematically extract economic surplus from the domestic 
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market, i.e., they are forced to act in a relatively competitive manner in 
buying and marketing the grain domestically. This, however, would not pre-
clude these large sellers from joining together to form a cartel in the in-
ternational market. 
The purpose of this paper, then, is to outline the behavior one might 
expect from such a cartel in the world market. The resulting model and 
theoretical results appear to be a generalization of the Schmitz-Just model 
of semi-price discrimination. 
In addition to determining the decision rule for profit maximization 
on the part of the cartel and demonstrating the Schmitz-Just result on the 
independence of the domestic and international price formation, we also 
discuss the major problems that are usually seen to face effective cartel-
ization. We are able to demonstrate that all interior solutions to our 
joint profit maximization problem possess what Osborne (1976) has termed 
the "ray property" and hence provide what appear to be effective and feas-
ible solutions to each of the commonly recognized major obstacles to effec-
tive cartelization. 
Section 1 discusses the basic rationale for setting up an international 
wheat cartel. Section 2 contains a brief but important discussion of the 
actual mechanics of the world wheat trade and why they argue for carteli-
zation on the part of producers. We discuss our reasons for rejecting 
the joint marketing board approach in Section 3, although it should be 
noted that our results would carry through to such a 3 member cartel act-
ing to maximize joint profits. In Section 4 we outline one model and dis-
cuss the major decision rules. Section 5 is devoted to examining and, 
hopefully, solving some of the more important problems associated with 
cartelization. 
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1. Marketing a Monopolizable Product 
Viewed in a large sense North America and Australia (NAAUS) have an 
effective monopoly position in the world wheat market. Although there 
are other large scale producers of wheat, their position in the world 
market is effectively dwarfed by the NAAUS position. For instance, in 
the period 1971-73 NAAUS accounted for approximately 97% of the net exports 
of wheat in the world market. Therefore, NAAUS is the dominant factor on 
the supply side in the world wheat market, and there appears to be poten-
tial for NAAUS to cartelize its exports. However, one must remember that 
it does not appear to be to the advantage of the exporting nations to al-
low such a cartel to exercise monopoly (monopsony) power in their domestic 
markets. 
Given that the optimal policy is to exploit the monopoly power in 
the export market, the remaining question of importance is how to go 
about it. This is particularly important in view of the structure of 
the North American wheat market. One major portion of the market 
(Canada) operates under a producer-oriented marketing board, while 
the other (United States) operates on a basically private trading system 
with some government involvement. One suggestion that has been bruited 
about is combining the overall supply side of the market into one large 
producer-oriented marketing board. We hope to demonstrate below that this 
may not be a feasible goal. As an alternative we suggest the formation 
of a cartel between the major U.S. grain exporting companies, the Canadian 
Wheat Board and the Australian Wheat Board. 
2. Mechanics of World Wheat Trade 
McCalla effectively describes the structure of the international 
wheat trade. However, his description gives little insight into the actual 
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mechanics of the international wheat trade. We feel closer examination of 
these mechanisms buttresses the argument for the organization of a wheat 
cartel. To see this more clearly let us consider the two major types of 
marketing instruments--the public tender and the privately negotiated 
contract. The public tender is an offer by an importing nation to pur-
chase wheat with all terms of the contract specified but price. Interested 
exporting nations and international middlemen may submit bids to fill all 
or a portion of the tender at one or a series of prices. In contrast, all 
terms of the privately negotiated contract are open to negotiation. Nego-
tiations are generally limited to invited traders--state trading monopsonies 
(monopolies) and international middlemen on the buying (selling) side. Both 
the public tender and privately negotiated contract could be effectively 
exploited by an international cartel. The cartel participants would sub-
mit a joint bid for public tenders while using their improved bargaining 
power to sway the final outcome of privately negotiated contracts. 
3. Why Not a Joint Marketing Board? 
One of the key obstructions to the formation of a joint marketing 
board between the United States, Canada and Australia is the structure 
of the U.S. wheat market. Perhaps the major reason the Canadian board is 
so viable today is that it has gradually evolved over the last fifty 
years. This wide experience and the relatively compact size of the market 
enhance the possibility for such cooperation. The U.S. market, however, 
has long operated under quite different principles and organization. To 
convert the U.S. market to a marketing board would involve tremendous 
transitional problems and difficulties that might entirely negate 
potential benefits to be derived from acting as a monopolist in the world 
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market. Establishing a worldwide information and sales network in order 
to make the marketing board effective would require large amounts of 
capital and time while only duplicating the private network already in 
existence. Perhaps of even greater importance would be the political 
issue of the division of power. It is doubtful that either producers 
or consumers could come to a quick agreement on this issue. Therefore, 
it seems much more attractive to take advantage of the superstructure 
that has evolved with the emergence of the country elevator, large grain 
company marketing system in the United States rather than trying to revamp 
the market structure of the United States. 
4. The Model 
Consider an industry with, say, n firms which buy grain in the domestic 
market and then market it internationally. For the purposes of our 
argument we shall consider the Canadian and the Australian Wheat Boards 
as two of these firms. Assume that the firms act together so as to 
maximize the overall profits of the export cartel. Further, it is as-
sumed that each member of the cartel is forced to act as a strict competi-
tor in buying grain. 
To proceed, let p denote the competitively determined acquisition 
price of wheat in the domestic market. Hence, each firm incurs at 
minimum a base cost of p times the amount of grain purchased--both 
for domestic and foreign sale. Let the function g.(Q~) represent 
l l 
costs over and above the purchase cost of grain required to market the 
internally, where Qd. is the amount of grain marketed internally by the 
l 
ag . 2 
. th a g. firm. Assume __ l > 0 __ l < o. l 
aqd. aqd. 2 
l l 
Now recognizing that the export of 
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·"' 
.,, 
grain incurs 
firm's cost 
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significantly different costs specify f.(Q . 
1 1 
f 
of marketing Q . of grain in foreign markets. 
1 
h . th as t e 1 
In addition 
to covering the cost of insurance, conditioning and storing grain for 
export, the function f. is also taken to include costs incurred in remov-
1 
ing grain from domestic trade channels and placing it in the hold of a 
vessel berthed in an export facility (i.e., fobbing costs), and if neces-
sary, the cost of cargo insurance and ocean freight rates. Total cost to 
the ith firm of marketing the amount (Qf. + Qd.) of 
1 1 
grain is then 
f Qd.) f d p (Q 1· + + f1.(Q 1.) + g (Q .). 
1 i 1 
We assume 
a2 f 
1 
ClQf.2 
1 
> o. 
Since the firms are joining together to exploit their monopoly posi-
tion in the world wheat market write the international price of wheat as 
n f 
pf(I Qi), i.e., price in international markets is a function of the total 
l=l . 
exports of the cartel. Internally, assume that the grain companies can 
charge a certain overage h.(Qd.,a) above the acquisition price to insure 
1 1 
coverage of domestic merchandising costs. Hence, we can write the revenue 
each firm can generate as pf c¥ Qf1.) + pQd.+h.(Qd.,a) where a represents a 1 1 1 i"'l 
governmental control parameter that prevents monopolization of the domestic 
market. We assume Clh 
i 
> O, Cla. 
1 
< 0. 
Therefore, the total profits of the cartel can be represented as 
n d n n f n d n f d 
IT"' pIQ . + pf(IQf.)· ~Q . +I h.(Q .,a) - pI(Q .+Q .) 
i=l 1 i=l 1 i=l 1 i=l 1 l i=l 1 1 
n f 
I f.(Q .) 
i=l 1 1 
n d 
- I g. (Q . ) 
i=l 1 1 
(1) 
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First order conditions for profit maximization are 
an Clh. Clg. + __ 1_ - 1 
()Qd. 
p p - 0 
ClQdi ()Qd. 
1 1 
1,2 ... n i (2) 
ar ()p f n Clf. .1 E Qf. f p 1 =-- + p 0 a f ()Qf i=l 1 ()Qf. Q i 1 
1, 2 ..• n i (3) 
n f 
where Q E 
i-1 
f Q •• 
1 
Therefore, profit maximization requires that the amount each 
member of the cartel markets domestically equates the marginal overage to 
marginal merchandising costs, while firms marketing the grain internationally 
equate the marginal revenue of the cartel as a whole to its marginal cost of 
marketing the grain. Interestingly, this implies that each firm will export 
less under a cartel arrangement than it would if it simply equated its mar-
ginal revenue to marginal costs as it would if it acted to maximize only its 
own profits. Graphically, these decisions can be depicted as in Figures 1 
and 2. More will be said about the implications of this result in the 
next section. 
5. Problems to Cartelization 
One of the most important problems facing any cartel is the problem of 
cartel stability. The major barriers to stability are external competition, 
sharing the cartel revenues, locating the contract surface, and detecting 
and det~rring cheating by ~embers. Because of the overwhelmingly predomi-
nant position the cartel we propose would have in the world wheat market, we 
feel it is safe to exclude the first problem from consideration. Unfortunately, 
this is not the case for the other four problems mentioned. In the following 
we shall attempt to show that the cartel described in the previous sections 
$ 
' 
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Figure 2 
'Vf 
Q i 
f 3_p_ Qf f 
- f . + p 
3Q 1 
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can in most cases effectively deal with the latter four problems. Our line 
of argument will closely follow that suggested by Osborne (1976) in his im-
portant paper on cartel problems. 
To proceed we need to first introduce the notion of the ith firm's 
profit function. Each firm's profit function will consist of two distinct 
parts--profits associated with domestic operations and profits associated with 
foreign operations which can be written respectively as 
and 
d d TI .(p,a,Q .) 
1 1 
f f TI .(IQ .,p) 
1 • J 
J 
f f pQ .-f.(Q .) 
1 1 1 
The total profit function for the ith firm then is Tid. + Tif. =TI .• 
1 1 1 
(4) 
(5) 
Using this definition of the profit function we are able to generate 
isoprofit contours. Differentiating TI. at a given level of profit and using 
1 
the implicit function theorem obtains 
-1 
a;id 
f 
aTI./aQ . 
- 1 J 
f 
aTI/aQ k 
ll{ f Qf f + p - p 
i dQ 
df. 
1 
- dQf. 
1 
(6) 
i#j ,j#k 
(7) 
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k=i 
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The important thing to notice about these relationships is that by (2) the 
the numerator of (7) will always be zero. Hence, what happens in the inter-
national market does not affect the profit maximizing decision for the domestic 
market and, therefore, domestic pricing decisions will be taken independently 
of what occurs in the international arena. As mentioned earlier this is a 
1 
generalization of the Schmitz and Just semi-price discrimination result. 
Turning to cartel behaviour, we see that the contract curve of possible 
cartel solutions will be the locus of tangencies between the isoprofit curves 
of then firms, i.e., points which are Pareto optimal in the sense that move-
ment away from it signals a decline in profits for at least one member of 
the cartel. By (7) we can ignore the domestic situation in the determination 
of the cartel point and we can, therefore, represent the contract curve in 
the two firm case as in Figure 3 where superscripts represent decreasing 
levels of profit. 
Once the cartel locates the contract curve and chooses a cartel point, 
say B, the cartel faces the additional problem that each individual firm has 
an incentive to cheat on the cartel by increasing his exports beyond the cartel 
point to the detriment of the other members of the cartel. This behavior 
':. 
.. 
"'f Q 2 
-f Q 2 
0 -f Q 1 
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is a direct consequence of (3) where it is seen that each firm equates its 
marginal costs of marketing the grain internationally to the 
revenue of the entire cartel. Now because of our assumption 
marginal 
a f on~ it is 
aqf 
clear that the marginal revenue of the cartel as a whole associated with an 
• 1 h • Qf • 1 h h •th f • I • 1 1ncrementa c ange in . is ess t an t e 1 1rm s marg1na revenue. 
1 
Hence, each firm perceives additional revenue to be captured by increasing 
its exports past the cartel point. Once this is done, however, cartel 
profits must fall by (3) and, therefore, any increase in the ith firm's 
profits as a result of expanding past the cartel point comes at the expense 
of the other members of the cartel. For instance, suppose the second member 
of the cartel decides to cheat by increasing his exports of wheat from the 
-f '\Jf 
cartel amount Q 2 to say Q 2 in Figure 3. While this increases his profits 
above profit level rr22 the profits of the other cartel member fall below rr21 
which in turn is an incentive for the loyal member to diverge from the cartel 
solution. In game theoretic terms the cartel faces a prisoner's dilemma, 
where as a whole the cartel is better off if no one cheats but each indi-
vidual has an incentive to cheat. 
Osborne (1976) has recently demonstrated that a quota rule which allows 
each loyal member of the cartel. to react to cheating by retaliation in the 
form of maintaining a constant share of the market can in many cases effec-
tively deter cheating. For this rule to be at all effective, however, one 
must be able to demonstrate that the hyperplanes tangent to each member's 
isoprofit surface at the cartel point intersect in a line L(Qf) which is a 
ray from the origin. If the solution to the profit maximization problem 
satisfies this condition then it is said to have the "ray property". We 
shall now demonstrate that the profit maximization conditions given in (3) 
have this property. 
... 
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To proceed, we shall follow Holahan and note that at the joint profit 
-f -f -f 
maximizing point Q = (Q ..... Q ) described by (3) each isoprofit curve is 
1 n 
tangent to a hyperplane that can be expressed as 
n 
E 
i=l 
f -f C.(Q.-Q.)=O 
lJ 1 1 
f h .ih h 1 h c or t e J yperp ane, were s .. are constants. 
1-J 
(8) then obtains 
f . f 
Q k - E SJ ik Q i = Tkj 
i=k 
(8) 
Using Qf to normalize k 
(9) 
where Tkj is the intercept of the jih hyperplane along the Qfk axis and 
sj ik are the slopes of the hyperplance in the Qfi,Qfk plane and are to be 
associated directly with (6) since the hyperplane is tangent to the isoprofit 
surface. Now substituting the n-1 expressions defined in (6) into (9) in 
turn implies 
f ~+ f 3.. Q . p - p -
J aqf aQf. 
Qfk + E Qf. + ---------~...___ __ 
i#k 1 ~ 
i#J' f 
aq 
Now multiplying through by one in the form 
obtains 
a f n df ~ E Qf + Pf _ P _ __j_ 
aqf k=l k aQf. 
_9-pf 
dQf 
T 
kj 
(10) 
and simplifying 
(11) 
B (3) h h f (11) . h' h h h .th y , owever, t e numerator o is zero w ic means t at t e J 
hyperplane intersects each axis at the origin for all j. Therefore, each 
-f hyperplane must have the origin and the point Q in common which in turn 
• 
' 
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implies the "ray property" for any internal solution to the .1oint profit maxi-
mization problem. 
Now that we have demonstrated that any solution to the profit maximiza-
tion problem has the "ray property" we shall introduce and briefly discuss 
Osborne's quota rule. A much more detailed discussion and several alterna-
tive quota rules are contained in Osborne (1976). To proceed, define 
-f Q i 
s. 1 n 
-f L: Q i 
i=l 
as the ith member's market share at the cartel point. The quota production 
rule for the jth member then is to produce 
max + k£K L: s 
k£K k 
where ~Qfk is the amount by which the kth member of the cartel cheats. In the 
case of a two member cartel this decision rule is demonstrated in Figures 4. 
Suppose that the cartel point is given by point A and further that the second 
"'f 
member decides to cheat in the form of exporting Q 2 • If the first firm 
detects the cheating and implements the quota rule described above he will 
"'f 
then export the anount Q . necessary to maintain his market share, which moves 
1 
the total level of exports back to a point on the ray from the origin. If 2 
expects 1 to react in this fashion he will not cheat because at B his profit 
is lower than it is at A. In most cases 1 will have the incentive to move to B 
sincehe loses less profit than he would if allowed the cheater to cheat without 
1 . . 2 reta 1at1on. 
Now that we have demonstrated that there appears to be a feasible deterrence 
program that the cartel could enact so as to limit cheating we turn to the 
'1. 
• 
) 
'Vf 
' 
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-f Q 2 
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-f Q 1 
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Figure 4 
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problem of discovering cheating. Deterrence can only be effective if cheating 
is discovered. For the case of the international wheat market we would argue 
that there would be a short time lag between cheating and discovery. All of 
the major grain companies maintain highly sophisticated information networks as 
do the major governments involved with their various inspection programs, etc. 
Hence, although there may be a very short time lag involved in the discovery 
process we feel that this could be compensated for by following Osborne's 
suggestion and adjusting the quota rule so as to keep the expected vector of 
outputs on the ray from the origin. In concluding this section on problems 
to cartelization we simply note that Osborne (1976) has demonstrated that any 
solution to the cartel problem which has the "ray property" effectively elimi-
nates the sharing problem (pp 840-1). 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Rather than recapitulate and summarize the results of the foregoing 
analysis let us first detail what our arguments do not imply. First and 
most importantly we do not mean to imply nor do we suscribe to the notion of 
using a wheat cartel to bring the OPEC oil cartel to heel. The basis of our 
argument is that the world wheat market is so structured as to offer advantages 
to the exporters of wheat as a result of cartelization. One of them is not 
the exercise of some type of predatory power over the OPEC nations. These 
nations simply are not large enough importers to make the wheat cartel an ef-
fective weapon. Any attempt to tighten the screws on their food supply would 
almost surely fail. 
Secondly, we do not mean to imply that the world is characterized by 
' 
the model we have presented. We feel that the domestic sector is fairly 
- 18 -
accurately modeled but our model of the international sector is more in the 
way of a proposal, better yet, a plan of action. That is, we feel that it is 
a start in the direction of developing behavioral objectives for just such a 
cartel as well as a means for coping with the very real cooperative problems 
cartelization will bring about. 
In closing, we would like to reiterate our feeling that cartelization 
may provide an effective means of taking advantage of our international trad-
ing position. Given the array of trade barriers the exporting nations face in 
world markets there appears to be little sense in clinging to the neoclassical 
paradigm of trade relations based on world welfare maximization when almost 
all our trading partners institute protectionary and/or monopolistic 
(monopsonistic) practices. So, why not a wheat cartel? 
' 
' 
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Footnotes 
ll This can also be demonstrated by noting that the n first order 
conditions given by (2) are independent of the n first order conditions 
given by (3) • 
J:./ Holahan has pointed out that in the case of extremely anti-symmetrical 
cost structures, it may not pay 1 to move to a point on the ray from the 
origin. However, we agree with Osborne's (1978) reply that this seems to be 
fairly unimportant in practice. 
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